Limitation of Shipowner Liability: Its American Roots and Some Problems Particular to Collision by Sweeney, Joseph
Fordham Law School
FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History
Faculty Scholarship
2001
Limitation of Shipowner Liability: Its American
Roots and Some Problems Particular to Collision
Joseph Sweeney
Fordham University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more
information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.
Recommended Citation
Joseph Sweeney, Limitation of Shipowner Liability: Its American Roots and Some Problems Particular to Collision, 32 J. Mar. L. & Com.
241 (2001)
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship/805
Journal of Maritime Law & Commerce, Vol. 32, No. 2, April, 2001
LIMITATION OF SHIPOWNER LIABILITY. ITS
AMERICAN ROOTS AND SOME PROBLEMS
PARTICULAR TO COLLISION
Joseph C. Sweeney*
I
INTRODUCTION
"As Maine goes, so goes the nation" once described American political
life.' It might also have described the origins of statutory limitation of
shipowners' liability in America, for the fingerprints of the State of Maine
can be seen in the legislation authored by Senator Hannibal Hamlin2 and
*The John D. Calamari Distinguished Professor of Law, Fordham University. A.B., Harvard
University; J.D., Boston University; LL.M., Columbia University. Member of the Editorial Board of the
Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce.
'The expression originated in the nineteenth century, when Maine held its federal and state elections
in September, instead of in November, the month specified by Congress in 1845 for the rest of the nation.
2Hannibal Hamlin (1809-1891) was born in Paris, Maine, where his father was a physician and Sheriff
of Oxford County. He attended nearby Hebron Academy. After his father's death, he read law and clerked
in the Portland law office of Samuel Fessenden. He was admitted to the Maine bar in 1833, elected as a
Democrat to the state legislature in 1835, and reelected six times. In 1842, he was elected to Congress,
and reelected in 1844. When, in 1846, he first sought a seat in the U.S. Senate, he was defeated. On a
second try in 1848, he was elected to the Senate, and then very narrowly reelected in 1854. He served as
the Chair of the Senate Commerce Committee until 1856, when he abandoned the Democratic Party
(because of the power of its pro-slavery elements) and joined the new Republican Party. In 1857, he was
elected Governor of Maine but served only a short time before being reelected to the Senate, where he
served again until 1861. At the convention of the Republican Party in Chicago in 1860, the New Yorker
William H. Seward led on the first two ballots for the presidential nomination, but on the third ballot,
Abraham Lincoln of Illinois captured the nomination. Hamlin was Seward's choice to balance the tick-
et. Hamlin's four years as Vice President were very frustrating; he was not part of Lincoln's inner circle
and was never consulted. He spent his days presiding over the Senate where he had once been a great
power. His views on the abolition of slavery were more radical than those of Lincoln. When, in 1864,
Lincoln renamed his party the National Union Party, he dropped the Republican Hamlin as his running
mate in favor of the War Democrat Andrew Johnson, the military governor of Tennessee. Hamlin returned
again to the Senate, where in 1869 and 1877, Republican majorities made him Chair of the Foreign
Relations Committee. He resigned from the Senate in 1881, and was appointed U.S. Minister to the court
of the restored monarch Alfonso XII of Spain, but he resigned that post the next year. He then returned
finally to Maine, where he died in 1891. See generally C. Hamlin, Life and Times of Hannibal Hamlin
(1899) and H. Hunt, Hannibal Hamlin, Lincoln's First Vice President (1969).
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derived from a statute3 enacted in 1821 by the brand new state of Maine.4
Maine was a powerful ship-building center in the age of sail, and Maine's
shipowners were carriers of capacity far beyond the needs of local industry.
The new legislation was not revolutionary, however; the concept went
back for centuries.' The needs of a growing industry6 and a spectacular deci-
sion of the Supreme Court of the United States, seen as a threat by shipown-
ers,7 provided the impetus for a national American effort to protect maritime
investors. The policy behind limitation of shipowners' liabilities affecting
innocent claimants was considered briefly then, when the federal law was
enacted in 1851, but never seriously since. Limitation of shipowners' liabil-
ity operated like a stealth bomber, off legal radar screens until after the
Second World War, when its repeal was demanded by the personal injury
bar. Justice Black framed the policy debate in 1954:
Many of the conditions in the shipping industry which induced the 1851
Congress to pass the [Limitation of Shipowner Liability] Act no longer pre-
vail. And later Congresses, when they wished to aid shipping, provided subsi-
dies paid out of the public treasury rather than subsidies paid by injured per-
sons.'
Gilmore and Black gave us a memorable phrase in 1975:
In the first edition of the treatise the foregoing discussion was concluded with
the observation: The Limitation Act has been due for a general overhaul for
the past seventy-five years; seventy-five years from now that statement will
still be true, except that the overhaul will then be one hundred and fifty years
overdue.9
'An Act respecting the wilful destruction and casting away of ships and cargoes; the custody of ship-
wrecked goods, and trade and navigation, 1821 Me. Laws 78, §§ 8-10, revised in 1840, 1857 and 1930.
See Sprague, Limitation of Ship Owners' Liability, 12 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. 568, 574-77 (1935).
'Fishermen were the first settlers of Maine, in 1622. The Massachusetts colony claimed the area in
1652, annexing it in 1668. In 1691, a royal charter granted the District of Maine to Massachusetts, even
though the two were physically separated by the New Hampshire colony. Shipbuilding and furnishing
masts and other naval stores for the Royal Navy were the principal industries. The economic and politi-
cal interests of Maine and Massachusetts diverged during and after the War of 1812, leading to a peace-
ful separation in 1820. As part of the Missouri Compromise of 1820, Maine was admitted to the Union.
See generally W. Rowe, The Maritime History of Maine (1948) and S. Morison, The Maritime History
of Massachusetts, 1783-1860 (1941).
'See Sprague, supra note 3, 568-574.6Registered tonnage in foreign trade increased from 537,563 gross tons in 1830 to 2,348,358 gross
tons in 1857. See J. Hutchins, The American Maritime Industries and Public Policy, 1789-1914 (1941),
304-07.
'New Jersey Steam Nav. Co. v. The Merchants' Bank of Boston (The Lexington), 47 U.S. (6 How.)
344 (1848). See text infra accompanying notes 40-67.
'Maryland Cas. Co. v. Cushing, 347 U.S. 409, 437, 1954 AMC 837, 859 (1954)(Black, J., dissent-
ing).
'G. Gilmore & C. Black, Jr., The Law of Admiralty 846 (2d ed. 1975).
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Nevertheless, until the Act is repealed, lawyers, insurers and their clients
must be aware of its broad scope and harmful potential, even though it can
no longer be a factor in setting insurance rates because of the likelihood of
successful challenges, chiefly because of the denial of limitation for liabili-
ties in the "privity or knowledge" of shipowner petitioners.'"
II
HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS
Because, in this country, limitation is entirely statutory, this review will
concentrate on the British and American legislation preceding the 1851 fed-
eral enactment. The late James J. Donovan surveyed the classical
antecedents in his 1979 article for the Tulane Admiralty Law Institute" and
readers are invited to look there for the Rhodian Law, the Code of Amalfi,
the Barcelona Consulado del Mare, the Codes of the Hanseatic League and
the 1681 Ordonnance de la Marine. A concept common to these historical
antecedents was the abandonment of the damaged ship to her creditors. 2
It was the possibility of single-ship disasters destroying the personal for-
tunes of shipowners that produced statutory relief in Great Britain in 1734.
At that time, British merchant adventurers were trading to India, the Arctic
(Russia), the Baltic, the Mediterranean and North America. 3 Marsden found
that the case of Boucher v. Lawson, 4 in which shipowners were held per-
sonally liable for a cargo of gold and silver stolen by the master, was the spur
for parliamentary action to limit liability.5 Industry spokesmen petitioned
"
0See, e.g., Spencer Kellog & Sons v. Hicks (The Linseed King), 285 U.S. 502, 1932 AMC 503
(1932); In re Marine Sulphur Queen, 460 F. 2d 89, 1972 AMC 1122 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied sub nom.
United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Marine Sulphur Transp. Corp., 409 U.S. 982 (1972); Empresa Lineas
Maritimas Argentinas, S.A. v. United States, 730 F. 2d 153, 1984 AMC 1698 (4th Cir. 1988).
"Donovan, The Origins and Development of Limitation of Shipowners' Liability, 53 Tul. L. Rev. 999,
1000-05 (1979); see also Sprague, note 3 supra, and Putnam, The Limited Liability of Ship-Owners for
Master's Faults, 17 Am. L. Rev. 1 (1883).
'
2Abandonment of the vessel to creditors was a feature of the early codes, see Donovan, supra note
11, 1003-05, and was incorporated in the Ordonnance de la Marine (1681) and the French Code de
Commerce (1807) (Art. 216). See also Sprague, supra note 3, 569-71 and Putnam, supra note 11, 2-13.
It is a rarely used part of the the 1851 American statute:
And it shall be deemed a sufficient compliance with the requirements of this act, on the part of
such owner or owners, if he or they shall transfer his or their interest in such vessel and freight,
for the benefit of such claimants, to a trustee to be appointed .... And after which transfer, all
claims and proceedings against the owner or owners shall cease.
46 U.S.C. § 184.
I'3D. Howarth, Sovereign of the Seas: The Story of Britain and the Sea 169-235 (1974).
"Cas. Temp. Hardw. 85 (1734).
'14 R. Marsden, The Law of Collisions at Sea 130 (British Shipping Laws, K. McGuffie rev. 11 th ed.
1961). "Boucher v. Lawson is clearly the case referred to in the petition of the shipowners set out in the
Journals of the House of Commons, Sess. 1733, p. 277." Id. at n. 15.
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Parliament for relief that was granted after a consideration of many of the
same arguments that would be made to the U.S. Senate in 1851-that
shipowners' investments would be discouraged by a risk of ruinous liability,
which Holland and other competing continental states had eliminated.'6
Parliament clearly expressed its sympathies and spelled out its purpose in
"An act to settle how far owners of ships shall be answerable for the acts of
the masters or mariners; and for giving further relief to the owners of
ships."' 7
Fifty years later, the English maritime industry returned to Parliament, for
expansion of the statutory coverage.'8 The new version, "An act ... for giv-
ing a further relief to the owners of ships," was approved by an accommo-
dating Parliament for an industry then even more powerful than it had been
fifty years before. 9
It appears that the English statutes and cases were still concerned with
single ship disasters in 1783, but a further expansion of the Limitation Act
in 1813 specifically provided for collision resulting from negligence. ° The
intent of Parliament to protect ocean transport is clear from the exclusion of
canal barges and vessels of inland navigation.2' Again, the parliamentary
"Marsden, supra note 15, at 134. See also Putnam, supra note 11, at 7-12.
177 Geo. 2 c. 15 (1734). This statute concerned losses to shippers from theft by master or crew. It was
enacted in the Seventh Parliament of the United Kingdom, during the administration of Sir Robert
Walpole, first prime minister.
1826 Geo. 3 c. 86 (1786). This statute concerned loss by fire as well as theft by other than master or
crew. See Marsden, supra note 15, at 132.
"D. Howarth, supra note 13, at 139-57.
"An Act to Limit Responsibility of Ship Owners in Certain Cases. 53 Geo. 3 c. 159 (1813). The key
provision reads:
That no Person or Persons who is, are or shall be Owner or Owners, or Part Owner or Owners of
any Ship or Vessel, shall be subject or liable to answer for or make good any Loss or Damage aris-
ing or taking Place by reason of any Act, Neglect, Matter or Thing done, omitted or occasioned,
without the Fault or Privity of such Owner or Owners, which may happen to any Goods, Wares,
Merchandize or other Things laden or put on board the same Ship or Vessel, after the First Day of
September One thousand eight hundred and thirteen, or which after the said First Day of
September One thousand eight hundred and thirteen may happen to any other Ship or Vessel, or
to any Goods, Wares, Merchandize or other Things, being in or on board of any other Ship or
Vessel, further than the Value of his or their Ship or Vessel, and the Freight due or to grow due for
and during the Voyage which may be in Prosecution or contracted for at the time of the happen-
ing of such Loss or Damage.
Marsden noted, "There does not appear to have been any considerable discussion in Parliament upon
the principle of either this or the subsequent acts limiting shipowners' liability," Marsden, supra note 15,
at 132 n. 17.
'53 Geo. 3 c. 159, § 5. See Marsden, supra note 15, at 132; Putnam, supra note 11, at 12 and Sprague,
supra note 3, at 571-74. The same limitation was built into the American statute when the bill was amend-
ed at the crucial debate (second reading), See text infra at notes 92-94. The inland navigation exclusion
was removed from the American statute in 1886. See infra note 94.
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purpose was to encourage investment in the industry. 2 The English law was
amended again in 1854 and 1862, and then reenacted in 1894, as part of the
Merchant Shipping Act. It retained the features of the 1813 statute until revi-
sion for conformity of British law with international conventions of 1924,
1957 and 1976.23
The ship-building, ship-owning and ship-operating Commonwealth of
Massachusetts adopted its version of the English statutes in 1819, for the
same reason that had persuaded three British parliaments-encouraging
investment in the ocean-going maritime industry in which Massachusetts
then specialized. 24 The Massachusetts statute would have benefited Maine
shipowners until 1820, when Maine separated from Massachusetts. After
statehood, Maine shipowners quickly persuaded the new Maine legislature
to follow the path of Massachusetts.
25
22See the preamble, "to increase the number of ships and vessels belonging to the United Kingdom...
and to prevent any discouragement to merchants." 53 Geo. 3 c. 159 (1813). Hull insurance was then avail-
able to shipowners, but protection and indemnity insurance of liabilities for cargo damage or personal
injuries would not be available from mutual associations (P & I Clubs) until 1855, when the Shipowners
Mutual Protection Society and the Mutual Association of Sailing Ship Owners (forerunner of the West of
England Steam Ship Owners' Protection and Indemnity Association) were founded. See N. Singh & R.
Colinvaux, Shipowners 485-86 (13 British Shipping Laws, 1967).
'The Merchant Shipping Act, 56 & 58 Vict. c. 30. The most recent international convention, the 1976
Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims was incorporated into British law in the
Merchant Shipping Act of 1979, Schedule 4. The Comitd Maritime International has produced, in 1924,
1957, and 1976, three conventions on this subject, reprinted in 6 Benedict on Admiralty, Docs. No. 5-1,
5-2 and 5-4 (F. Wiswall ed., 7th ed. rev. 2000).
24An Act to encourage Trade and Navigation within this Commonwealth, 1819 Mass. Acts 193. See
Putnam, supra note 11, at 13 and Sprague, supra note 3, at 574-77. The key provision reads:
Section 1 .... no person or persons who is, are or shall be owner or owners in part or in whole, of
any ship or vessel shall be subject or liable to answer for or make good to any one or more per-
son or persons any loss or damage, by reason of any embezzlement, secreting or making away
with, by the master or mariners, or any of them of any goods, wares or merchandize or any prop-
erty whatsoever which shall be shipped, taken in or put on board any ship or vessel or for any act,
matter or thing, damage or forfeiture done, occasioned or incurred by the said master or mariners
or any of them without the privity or knowledge of such owner or owners further than the value
of the interest which such owner or owners have or had, at the time of such shipment in the ship
or vessel, with all her appurtenances and the full amount of his interest in the freight due or to
grow due for and during the voyage wherein such embezzlement secreting or making way with,
as aforesaid or other malversation of the master or mariners shall be made, committed or done any
law, usage or custom to the contrary notwithstanding.
The mystery of the Massachusetts statute is that it tracks more closely the 1786 version of the English
statute than the newer 1813 version; perhaps the newer version, enacted during the War of 1812, was
unknown to the draftsmen in Massachusetts. The 1819 statute of Massachusetts was revised in 1835,
1860, and 1882 before being repealed in 1902, in favor of the federal act.25See supra note 3.
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III
BACKGROUND OF THE FEDERAL LIMITATION OF
LIABILITY ACT
A. The 1851 Maritime Industry
1. The Ocean-going industry
American packet service, 26 often using the very fast clipper ships,27 domi-
nated the carrying trades in many parts of the world at this time, while the
Port of New York dominated American foreign trade. In the North Atlantic,
cotton was the principal American export, while machinery, iron, copper,
coal and luxury goods were the imports; many of the sailing ships also car-
ried emigrants from Ireland, Scotland and Germany. The discovery of gold
in California led quickly to greatly increased American inter-ocean service,
by way of Panama or Cape Horn,29 a trade protected from foreign competi-
tion by the cabotage law.3" This was also the time when the China and India
tea trade increased significantly." The infamous triangle trade-Caribbean
sugar to New England, distilled rum to Africa and slaves to the Caribbean-
by which great fortunes had been made in the eighteenth and early nine-
teenth centuries, had been suppressed legally, although an illegal slave trade
continued. 2 When the Erie Canal opened in 1825, it presented a tremendous
volume of agricultural products in bulk for export, at the same time enhanc-
ing the movement of imports to the hinterland. In sum, trade was booming
when the federal limitation of liability statute was enacted, and would con-
tinue to do so until the financial panic of 1857."3 In the next ten years, dur-
ing and after the American Civil War, the American ocean-going industry
See generally R. Albion, Square Riggers on Schedule: The New York Sailing Packets to England,
France and the Cotton Ports (1938) and R. Albion, The Rise of New York Port, 1815-1860 (1939).
1C. Cutler, Greyhounds of the Sea: The Story of the American Clipper Ship (1930).
2 See generally Albion, supra note 26, and Cutler, id. The North Atlantic situation is described in B.
Tyler, Steam Conquers the Atlantic (1939); C. Ridgeley-Nevitt, American Steamships on the Atlantic
(1981); and J. Brinnin, The Sway of the Grand Saloon: A Social History (1931). The emigrant experience
is described in E. Laxton, The Famine Ships (1996) and Herman Melville's novel, Redbum, His First
Voyage (1849). See also A. Nevins, Sail On, The Story of the American Merchant Marine (1946).
29See J. Delgado, To California by Sea: A Maritime History of the California Gold Rush (1990).
3'Cabotage laws restrict the carriage of passengers and cargo between domestic ports to American
built vessels enrolled for such trade. See, e.g., the Navigation Act of 1817, 3 Stat 351.
"See generally F. Dulles, The Old China Trade (1930); E. May & J. Fairbank, America's China Trade
in Historical Perspective (1986), and J. Perry, Facing West: Americans and the Opening of the Pacific
(1994).
"1See generally D. Mannix & M. Cowley, Black Cargoes: A History of the Atlantic Slave Trade 1518-
1865 (1962) and H. Thomas, The Slave Trade: The Story of the Atlantic Slave Trade 1440-1870 (1997).
"See supra note 6.
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would begin a rapid decline that has not ceased.34 As America's sailing ships
of wood decayed, their places would be taken by British steam ships of steel,
and control of ocean trade would pass from the shipowners of America to
those of her British rival.
2. Coastal Shipping
Until the middle of the nineteenth century, all American cities were to be
found on waterways. Sailing packet service connected Atlantic and Gulf
ports before the advent of wagon roads or railroads. It would be years before
the railroads could compete." Sailing vessels continued in service for many
years, although some side-wheel steamboats were introduced to Long Island
Sound and Chesapeake Bay. The cabotage law protected American
shipowners from foreign competition in these waters.36
3. Internal Shipping: Canals, Rivers and Lakes
In the era in which the federal limitation act emerged, river and lake traf-
fic had increased dramatically, because of the advent of the steamboat-ini-
tially side-wheel vessels, subsequently stem paddle-operated.37 Cincinnati,
St. Louis, Memphis, Cleveland and Chicago became major ports. The open-
ing of the Erie Canal in 182538 greatly shortened the route for movement of
mid-western produce to eastern markets, offering an alternative to river
transport on the Ohio and Mississippi for transfer at New Orleans to ocean-
going vessels bound for coastal or overseas markets.39 The age of the steam-
boat was also the age of spectacular explosions of steam boilers causing
many deaths, injuries and substantial cargo damage.
'See generally Nevins, supra note 28; A. Gibson & A. Donovan, The Abandoned Ocean (2000); S.
Lawrence, United States Merchant Shipping Policies and Politics (1966); G. Mangone, Marine Policy for
America (1972). See also R. Carlisle, Sovereignty For Sale: The Origins and Evolution of the Panamanian
and Liberian Flags of Convenience (1981) and G. Jantscher, Bread Upon the Waters: Federal Aids to the
Maritime Industries (1975).
3 See A. Chandler, ed., The Railroads, the Nation's First Big Business (1965); W. Daniels, American
Railroads: Four Phases of Their History (1932) and 0. Jensen, The American Heritage History of
Railroads in America (1975). See also D. Holly, Tidewater by Steamboat: A Saga of the Chesapeake
(1991).
6See supra note 30.
"See generally L. Hunter, Steamboats on the Western Rivers: An Economic and Technological History
(1949) and E. Haites, J. Mak & G. Walton, Western River Transportation: The Era of Early Internal
Development 1810-1860 (1975).
"See generally R. Shaw, Canals for a Nation: The Canal Era in the United States 1790-1860 (1991).
"See generally J. Morrison, History of American Steam Navigation (1903) and Burke, Bursting
Boilers and the Federal Power, (1816-1852), 7 Tech. & Culture 1 (1966).
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B. The Lexington Controversy of 1848
In New Jersey Steam Navigation Co. v. The Merchants' Bank of Boston
(The Lexington),' the Supreme Court of the United States held the owner of
a steamboat liable for the value of a chest, said to contain gold and silver
coins, lost when an unseaworthy vessel sank following a fire. The shipper,
claiming $25,000 in damages, had alleged, in contract and tort, that the coins
had been delivered on board the steamboat Lexington at New York, for ship-
ment to Boston. The shipper further alleged that the Lexington was a com-
mon carrier, that the chest had been carelessly stowed, that the machinery of
the steamboat was imperfect and insufficient, and that the careless, improp-
er, and negligent management and conduct of employees, servants and
agents of the respondent had contributed to the loss of the cargo.' The ship-
per attached The Massachusetts, a sister ship, to begin the litigation in fed-
eral court in Rhode Island.42
The shipowner denied these allegations and maintained that an implied
condition of the underlying contract made it responsible only for ordinary
care and diligence and that notice of its non-liability was posted on the
wharf, onboard the steamboat, and in its sales office.43 Although the district
court dismissed the libel, the circuit court (Story and Pitman) took testimo-
ny and gave judgment for the shipper for full damages ($22,000)."
The Lexington was a paddle-wheel steamboat engaged in regular multi-
modal liner service between New York and Boston.45 The shipper, the
Merchants' Bank of Boston, shipped a wooden chest of gold and silver
coins, without informing the carrier of the contents, although the weight of
the coins may have made its valuable contents obvious.46 The bill of lading
excepted "danger of fire, water, breakage, leakage, and all other accidents"
'47 U.S. (6 How.) 344 (1848).
'Id. at 350-5 1.
421d. at 352.
41d. at 346-47.
"Id. at 353.
4'Id. at 346-52. The Lexington normally proceeded from New York to Stonington, Connecticut, where
passengers and cargo transferred to the new Shore Line Railroad for Providence and Boston. On January
13, 1840, the Lexington sailed from New York with 150 passengers and 150 bales of cotton. Her steam
powerplant had just been converted from wood to the hotter fuel of coal, without enhancement of her fan
blowers for cooling. Underway, her smoke stacks soon grew red-hot and ignited her woodwork, the fire
quickly spreading to cotton bales stowed nearby. Although the fire broke out when the Lexington was only
four miles from land, her pilot failed in his attempt to run her ashore, and she sank, a total loss. The lost
cargo on which suit was based consisted of approximately $18,000 in silver and gold coins in a wooden
chest owned by a freight forwarder. The coins may have been thrown overboard when the chest was com-
mandeered for use as a water tank in fighting the fire.
47 U.S. at 346-47.
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and limited carrier liability to $200 per package.4 7 After the vessel departed
from New York, a fire broke out that could not be controlled. The ship sank
in Long Island Sound, taking the lives of all but four of the 150 passengers
and causing the loss of plaintiff's chest of coins. 8
The shipowner denied negligence, asserting that its servants exercised
ordinary care, and that, in any event, it was not liable because of its notices
of non-liability in the bill of lading exculpatory clause and the posted signs.49
The case was argued twice in the Supreme Court: in January and
December of 1847. Rhode Island lawyers Ames and Whipple argued for the
shipowner."s R.W. Greene from Rhode Island argued for the shipper, but the
principal advocate for the shipper was Daniel Webster, Whig Senator from
Massachusetts and former (and future) Secretary of State.'
4The bill of lading provided, after spaces for the names of the shipper, consignee, and vessel, ...
danger of fire, water, breakage, leakage, and all other accidents excepted; and no package whatever, if
lost, injured or stolen, to be deemed of greater value than two hundred dollars...." At the wharf, a sign
with the following warning was posted: "Notice to shippers and Consignees[:] All goods, freight, bag-
gage, bank-bills, specie, or any other kind of property, taken, shipped, or put on board the steamers...
must be at the risk of the owners of such goods...." 47 U.S. at 346-47.
"Id. at 356-58.
'
9Id. at 350 and at 346.
'In the Supreme Court, the shipowner contended that there was no admiralty jurisdiction since the
contract was made in New York City and the voyage through Long Island Sound was land-locked, citing
The Thomas Jefferson, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 428 (1825), and its underlying proposition that the statute of
Richard II excluded admiralty jurisdiction from ports, creeks, and havens, and implying the same restraint
on the land-locked waters in question. Id. at 352. In the respondent's view, admiralty jurisdiction was only
available for possessory or petitory suits and for mariners'wages, not for contracts made on land. Id. at
359-62. The respondent also argued that even if there was a contract, there was no contract between the
carrier and the shipper (although separate contracts did exist between the carrier and the freight forwarder
and the freight forwarder and the shipper). Id. at 363-68.
"Daniel Webster (1782-1852), born in Salisbury, N.H., attended Phillips Exeter Academy before he
attended Dartmouth College, from which he graduated in 1801. He read law in Boston, but moved to
Portsmouth, N.H. to begin the practice of law (from 1807). He entered politics there as a Federalist and
was elected to Congress for two terms (1813-1817). In 1816, he removed to Boston to practice law and
politics. He was elected to Congress from Massachusetts for two terms (1823-27), and then, in 1827, to
the U.S. Senate, where he became a leader of the new Whig Party. In 1841, President Tyler appointed
Webster Secretary of State, and he served for two years. He was reelected to the Senate in 1845, holding
that office until 1850, when he was again appointed Secretary of State, serving President Fillmore for two
years until Webster's death (1852). In the year of his death, he sought the Whig nomination for president
but lost to General Winfield Scott. He died at his farm in Marshfield, Massachusetts, on Oct. 24, 1852.
Webster's frequent service in Washington enabled him to have a very active and lucrative practice before
the U.S. Supreme Court, beginning in 1814. He argued 249 cases in the court-which was then located
on the floor beneath the Senate chamber in the U.S. Capitol. Among his famous cases were: Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1(1824); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); Trustees of
Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.)
264 (1821); Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824); and Proprietors of the
Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of the Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837). See C. Fuess,
Daniel Webster (1930).
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During the second argument, Webster argued that the case was within
admiralty jurisdiction and that the shipowners, as common carriers, were
liable for the loss without proof of actual negligence. 2 The second argument
lasted eight days, dealing extensively with English and continental history
and precedents.
The opinion of the Court, affirming the decree of the circuit court, was
written by Justice Samuel Nelson, an experienced commercial and admiral-
ty lawyer and former Chief Justice of the New York Supreme Court. 3 He
was joined in the opinion by Chief Justice Taney, and Justices McLean and
Wayne. For the Court, Justice Nelson first held that there was a single con-
tract of transportation between the shipper and the carrier (citing New York
and Pennsylvania cases).' Were it not for this "special agreement," respon-
dent, as a common carrier, would be regarded as an insurer of the goods and
accountable for any damage or loss in the course of the conveyance, unless
the same arose from an inevitable accident, such as an act of God or the pub-
lic enemy.5 Justice Nelson framed the issue as follows:
The general liability of the carrier, independently of any special agreement, is
familiar. He is chargeable as an insurer of the goods, and accountable for any
damage or loss that may happen to them in the course of the conveyance,
unless arising from inevitable accident-in other words, the act of God or the
public enemy. The liability of the respondents, therefore, would be undoubt-
ed, were it not for the special agreement under which the goods were shipped.
The question is, to what extent has this agreement qualified the common law
liability? ... But admitting the right thus to restrict his obligation, it by no
"Id. at 377. He argued that Congress, by enacting the Judiciary Act of 1789 and the Great Lakes Act
of 1845, had made American admiralty jurisdiction coextensive with the constitutional grant.
"Samuel Nelson (1792-1873) was the Supreme Court's admiralty expert in the middle years of the
19th century, having served 27 years (1845-72). His appointment by President John Tyler followed Senate
rejection or withdrawal of three previous nominees. Nelson came from Hebron, in upstate New York,
attended Middlebury College, and was admitted to the New York bar in 1817. He had a successful com-
mercial and admiralty practice in New York City. He entered politics in the early days of his career and
served as a delegate to the New York constitutional convention in 1821. In 1831, he was appointed an
Associate Justice of the New York Supreme Court (a trial court), and became its Chief Justice in 1836. A
Jacksonian Democrat, he was easily confirmed by the Democratic-majority Senate in 1845, five days
before Tyler left office. Justice Nelson wrote the Court's opinion in The Schooner Catharine v. Dickinson,
58 U.S. (17 How.) 170 (1855), which imposed the equal division of damages rule in both-to-blame colli-
sions until displaced by United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 1975 AMC 541 (1975). He
dissented in The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863), because he required a congressional decla-
ration of war to justify the blockade of Confederate ports. He wrote the majority opinion in The Plymouth,
70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20, 1999 AMC 2403 (1866), restating the principle that both the commission and the
consummation of a maritime tort must occur on navigable waters, a doctrine set aside in Executive Jet
Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 1973 AMC 1 (1972). See Sprow, Samuel Nelson, in K.
Hall, ed., Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States, 583-84 (1992).
5"47 U.S. at 380.
"Id. at 381-82.
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means follows that he can do so by any act of his own ... he should not be
permitted to exonerate himself without the assent of the parties concerned.
And this is not to be implied or inferred from a general notice to the public,
limiting his obligation, which may or may not be assented to.56
After considering the evidence as to improper stowage and negligent fire-
fighting, Justice Nelson found the carrier liable, notwithstanding the special
agreement. 7 He held that the exculpatory language relied upon by the
shipowners could not overcome their obligations as common carriers, and
therefore as insurers, so that the shipper could recover its damages in full.58
Concurring in the judgment of the Court, Justice Catron relied on mar-
itime tort theory for carrier liability, for which Arthur Browne was present-
ed as authority.59 Dissenting, Justice Daniel, wrote a twenty-four page opin-
ion, in which Justice Grier seems to have joined.'" Ever opposed to expand-
ing federal power, Daniel turned first in his opinion to the statutes of Richard
II, noting in his historical review that "the common law of England is the
one uniform rule to determine the jurisdiction of our courts."6' As had Justice
Catron, Justice Daniel turned also to Arthur Browne as authority, because
"scarcely any assertion of power ever made by the Admiralty courts, how-
ever reprobated and denied by the common law tribunals, is not commend-
ed, if not justified" by Browne.62 With palpable irony, Justice Daniel then
endorsed Browne's conclusion that contracts made on land for execution on
the sea are not within admiralty jurisdiction, excepting those for seamen's
wages and hypothecations.63 Respecting Justice Catron's alternative ration-
ale based on tort theory, Justice Daniel again quoted Browne: "[W]e have
the explicit declaration of Professor Browne himself, amidst all his partiali-
ty, that in matters of tort the jurisdiction of the admiralty is limited to actions
for assault, collision and spoil."64
Justice Woodbury also concurred in the result reached by the Court, pre-
ferring Catron's tort theory for its rationale. He seems to have written sepa-
rately in order to respond to Justice Daniel, pointing out that, by 1789, the
place of performance of the contract, rather than the place of contracting,
16Id. at 390.
7Id. at 385.
11Id. at 383-85.
"Id. at 394. Arthur Browne's treatise, A Compendious View of the Civil Law and of the Law of the
Admiralty (1802-03) was the principal treatise in use in the federal courts, having been republished in
New York in 1840. See Sweeney, The Admiralty Law of Arthur Browne, 26 J. Mar. L. & Com. 59 (1995).
647 U.S. at 418.
"Id. at 400.
61d. at 400-03.
13Id. at 404.
"Id. at 401.
April 2001
252 Journal of Maritime Law & Commerce
was being used, even in England, to determine admiralty jurisdiction, so
long as the subject matter was maritime.65
Notwithstanding the ensuing outcries from shipowners, the lasting impor-
tance of The Lexington is its holding that carriers can be held liable for neg-
ligent damage to cargo, despite exculpatory language in their contracts of
carriage. That holding served well the producers of the American heartland
when shipping on rivers, lakes, and oceans was still vital to the nation's
economy, protecting them from over-reaching by both transporters and their
insurers.
Not long after the Supreme Court's decision in The Lexington, the case of
the packet ship Henry Clay added to the anxiety of the shipping industry.
The Henry Clay burned at the wharf in New York on Sept. 4, 1849, after
loading, but before getting underway. Cargo owners sued the shipowner for
their losses. Even though there was no proof of actual fault or negligence,
the shipowner was held liable.'
C. The Legislative History of the 1851 Act
1. Organization of the Thirty-First Congress
The Thirty-First Congress, elected in November of 1848, was organized
by the Democrats, despite the simultaneous election of the Whig President
Zachary Taylor.67 There were 112 Democrats to 109 Whigs and 13 Free-
Soilers in the House, where three weeks of raucous debate were required
before Howell Cobb of Georgia was chosen Speaker. The House was con-
stantly in turmoil thereafter, because of bitter fights between factions of the
North and South in both major parties.68 In the sixty-two-member Senate, the
OId. at 420.
"'The decision in The Henry Clay is not officially reported; however, the facts of that case are recount-
ed in Wright v. Norwich & N.Y. Transp. Co. (The City of Norwich), 30 F. Cas. 685, 687 (C.C.D. Conn.
1870) (No. 18,087), aff'd, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 104 (1872). Three years after the fire aboard the Henry Clay,
the restored side-wheeler, largest of her day, again caught fire, this time during a race on the Hudson
River. Sixty passengers died, and the officers were indicted for manslaughter. See The Henry Clay, 11 F.
Cas. 1164 (S.D.N.Y. 1852) (No. 6,375). The case of The Henry Clay was mentioned several times in the
1851 debate on the limitation of liability, and that vessel's two disasters also prompted legislation for
stricter inspections of steam vessels.
0H. Holman, Election of 1848, in 2 A. Schlesinger, Jr. & F. Israel eds., History of American
Presidential Elections 1789-1968 (1971). The intellectual and political history of the period may be
reviewed in: L. Hartz, Economic Policy and Democratic Thought 1776-1860 (1948); 1 A. Nevins, Ordeal
of the Union: Fruits of Manifest Destiny 1847-1852 (1947); M. Holt, The American Whig Party:
Jacksonian Politics and the Onset of the Civil War (1999).
"The Southern Whigs would not support the Northern Whig candidate for Speaker; Freesoilers object-
ed to the Southern Democrat, Cobb, who was elected on the sixty-third ballot. Cobb (1815-1868) became
a Major General in the Confederate army.
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Democrats enjoyed a majority of ten. William R. King' of Alabama was
President Pro-Tempore; he would later serve as Vice President to President
Franklin Pierce. In accordance with the practice prior to the Twentieth
Amendment, the Congress elected in November 1848 did not assemble for
its first session until December 1849; the second session would not assem-
ble until December 1850 (after another congressional election). That session
adjourned on March 3, 1851, the day on which the federal limitation of lia-
bility statute was enacted.7"
Senator Hannibal Hamlin, Democrat of Maine was the Chair of the Senate
Commerce Committee. He introduced the limitation of liability bill on
Tuesday, January 28, 1851, quoting only the language of the bill.7' Senator
Badger72 became the principal opponent of the bill; he suggested delay
because of the major change it introduced in the liability of shipowners.73 In
response, Senator Hamlin stressed its similarity to the existing English
statutes:
This bill is predicated on what is now the English law, and it is deemed advis-
able by the Committee on Commerce that the American marine should stand
at home and abroad as well as the English marine. Senators who may be dis-
posed to look into the provisions of the English law, will find in the ninth, six-
teenth, and thirtieth volumes of the English statutes the very principle con-
tained in this bill. When the bill shall come up for discussion, I shall be ready
to offer such suggestions as force themselves upon my mind, to show the
necessity and propriety of this measure."
'Sixty-two senators, from thirty-one states, were presided over by the Whig Vice President, Fillmore,
until the death of President Taylor. William R. King (1786-1853) had spent 30 years in the Senate.
7
'The principal product of this fractious Congress was Henry Clay's Compromise of 1850, a mine-
field of sectional discord, which prompted eight months of fierce rhetorical confrontation. The compro-
mise consisted of five statutes: admission of California as a free state; organization of New Mexico
Territory and adjustment of the boundaries of Texas; organization of Utah Territory; a new Fugitive Slave
Act under federal jurisdiction; and abolition of the slave trade in the District of Columbia. See generally,
H. Holman, Prologue to Conflict: The Compromise of 1850 (1964). Many details can be discovered in
biographies of participants in the debates: R. Remini, Henry Clay, Statesman for the Union (1991); C.
Schurz, Henry Clay (1915); G. Capers, Stephen A. Douglas, Defender of the Union (1959) and R.
Johannsen, Stephen A. Douglas (1973).
"Cong. Globe, 31st Cong. 2d Sess. 334-35 (1851).
"George Edmund Badger (1795-1866) was born in New Bern, North Carolina (former colonial capi-
tal), attended Yale College (1810-11), read law and was admitted to the bar in 1814, afterwards practic-
ing in New Bern. He was elected to the lower house of the North Carolina Assembly in 1816, and then to
the Superior Court, where he served from 1820 to 1825. He moved to the new capital, Raleigh, where he
practiced law until appointed Secretary of the Navy by President Harrison in 1841. He served only six
months before resigning and returning to Raleigh. He was elected to the U.S. Senate as a Whig in 1846,
reelected in 1849 and served until 1855. Badger was one of President Fillmore's nominees to the U.S.
Supreme Court, but action on the nominations was postponed by the Democratic Senate until the new
Democrat president, Pierce, took office. See Biographical Directory of the American Congress, 1774-
1996 at 602 (J. Treese, ed. 1997).
"Cong. Globe, 31st Cong. 2d Sess. 332 (1851).
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Senator Hale (Dem., N.H.) then moved to send the bill to the Judiciary
Committee, because of the change it would make in the common law liabil-
ity of carriers:
I have looked at this bill and examined it, and it will be found that it cuts up
the whole common law in regard to common carriers in this country. I will not
say that it is not right; but I think a bill making such fundamental changes in
the common law ought to have the sanction of the Judicial Committee. I wish
to make a single remark, though I do not wish to be understood as against the
bill. I have examined it and the English statutes and, as has been suggested,
the bill is an abstract of the English law in regard to this subject.75
Senator Hamlin replied that the Committee on Commerce had consulted
intelligent merchants and commercial men who knew more about the needs
of commerce than the judiciary, and repeated that the bill conformed to the
law of England. Senator Butler (Dem., S.C.) then noted that the bill had
come from a respectable committee [Commerce], fully competent to decide
upon it, thus no reference to the Judiciary Committee was necessary. Sen.
Hale then withdrew his motion.
2. The Debate in the United States Senate
The only public consideration of this change in policy so beneficial to
shipowners occurred on Wednesday, February 26, 1851, in the Committee of
the Whole.7 6 Initially, there was opposition to considering Hamlin's bill
because of other pressing business, but Hamlin prevailed and presented the
bill as Chair of the Committee on Commerce.77 As is usually the case, pro-
posed maritime legislation was not a partisan matter; Whigs and Democrats
were to be found on both sides of the debate. Senator Badger (Whig, N.C.)
stated his intention to oppose the bill because of the total change it would
effect in the common law of carrier liability and wished to delay considera-
tion:
But I must say, nevertheless, that I think it is a little unreasonable to expect
that that bill shall be taken up, considered, and passed at this period of the ses-
sion. It is a bill as the honorable Senator well knows, proposing to make a total
change in the rule of the liability of carriers on the water, and to substitute for
these rules, which have prevailed ever since this Government had an existence,
an entirely new system.
Now, I am not prepared to say that, upon a full and thorough examination of
the bill of the Committee on commerce, it may not be right and proper. That
751d.
7 1Id. at 713-720.
"Id. at 713-15.
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it needs very considerable modification in some particulars, I am satisfied. In
the main it may be right and proper, but there are great doubts about it. It is
an important alteration in an important branch of the marine law. It is an alter-
ation that ought not to be made without full and grave consideration and the
most ample opportunity for discussion, and without attributing any fault to
anybody-for fault is not to be attributed in any quarter that I know of-it is
nevertheless certain that we have now arrived at a period of the session when
it would be extremely unwise for Congress to undertake to make alteration in
the little time we have left for its consideration. If this subject is to be consid-
ered, however, I hope that it will be considered tomorrow. I have a book or
two, to which I wish to refer for the purpose of showing that in one aspect of
the case there is no necessity for this bill, and in another that some of the pro-
visions of it will operate mischievously. I hope, therefore, at least, that we will
not take it up today.7"
Sen. Davis (Whig, Mass.) was moved to intervene in favor of the bill,
because it substantially affected a vital national interest:
[The bill] proposes to change a system which has existed for a great period of
time. I wish only to say in reply to that, that it is by a recent decision [The
Lexington] some two or three years since, that the owners of ships have com-
prehended their liabilities. It is by an interpretation and construction given to
them by courts below that they now understand that if a ship lying at the wharf
in New York takes fire and burns up without fault on the part of the owners,
they are liable as common carriers [The Henry Clay]. This becomes a very seri-
ous question-one that affects that interest very deeply; and therefore it is that
it is necessary that the law should be changed. Now, I would be very much grat-
ified if the question could be decided this session; and if the Senator from
Maine presses the consideration of the measure I, for one, will sustain him. I
am not allowed, upon the question of taking up the bill, to go into the merits of
the law that is proposed in the bill. I will only say, that it is the adoption of a
system which has been several years in operation in England, with certain
alterations merely, as I understand it, to adapt it to the affairs of this country,
and nothing more. It is simply placing our mercantile marine upon the same
footing as that of Great Britain. We are carriers side by side with that nation, in
competition with them, and we cannot afford very well to give them any great
advantage over us without affecting our interest very seriously.79
Sen. Pearce (Whig, Md.) supported the principle embodied in the bill, but
urged postponement of consideration until work on the appropriations bills
was complete. Sen. Cass (Dem., Mich.) interjected that it was a change
essential to preserving an American industry:
[A]s I understand this matter, the liabilities of shipowners in foreign countries
have been reduced, while those of our own shipowners, if not actually
7 Id. at 714.
"Id.
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increased, have been effectively so by the decision of the Supreme Court.
Now, how are we to continue our commercial interest on a firm foundation
unless we put our shipowners on the same footing with those of other coun-
tries? Is there a more important matter than one like this, in which the inter-
est of our whole commercial marine is at stake?"
Sen. Hamlin then noted the conflicting interests of shipowners and ship-
pers, but that The Lexington decision required immediate action,
Perhaps I have been more familiar than any other with the views of shipown-
ers and importing merchants upon this question. They have interests perhaps
directly opposite each other, so far as the risks may be concemed. But the
Senator from Massachusetts has well said that until recently our shipowners
have not understood the extent of their liabilities. Indeed, there are many of
them who do not understand them now. And at this time there is a great deal
of feeling among that class of our community who have discovered that they
are underwriters for everybody for whom they may transport goods. It is a
question which the Senator from Michigan has well said affects the commerce
of the whole country.'
Sen. Badger, however, resumed his attack on taking up a measure that
would change the existing liability of carriers, something well understood by
all common carriers.82
The motion to postpone consideration was lost on a vote to immediately
take up consideration of the bill, 23 votes to consider, 13 votes to postpone,
surely a crucial indication of majority support.83
Sen. Hamlin then made amendments to the text and reviewed all its pro-
visions, using the statutory language. He clearly did not believe that greater
liabilities would increase the carefulness of mariners, whose very lives were
at risk.
Hamlin's speech is the functional equivalent of the modem committee
report. Only the portions dealing with general limitation of liability
(Sections Three and Four) are reproduced:
The third section of the bill provides that the owner of any vessel shall be
liable only to the full extent of ownership in the vessel.
The fourth section provides a remedy for the parties who may sustain a loss
where the value of the vessel and her freight for the voyage shall not be suffi-
cient to pay the whole amount of the loss.
wId.
'Id.
121d. at 715.
83Id.
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These two sections are substantially the English law. What is now the risk and
liability of a shipowner? You send him abroad upon the ocean with all that he
is worth. He may be connected with individuals with whom he has no knowl-
edge, and he is made liable by the acts of others for an amount which not only
puts him to the risk of the value of his vessel which is afloat, but of all his own
fortune. We have here, in this very Senate, time after time, changed the prin-
ciple of the common law, and made it applicable to men who are at home in
their own vicinage, who can inspect their own business, precisely to the extent
that it is proposed to make it applicable in this bill. It is an encouragement to
our navigating interest all over the land. It is removing some of those liabili-
ties by which every man who is connected with that interest and is able to
respond to the damages that properly belong to him, will do so, and continue
in the business. But if they are to be held liable to the extent of the law as it
now is, men of pecuniary ability who are able to respond to damages will be
driven out of it, and another class of irresponsible men will take their places,
and thus make the commercial interests less protected than they would be
without the adoption of this section....
These are the provisions of the bill. It is true that the changes are most radical
from the common law upon the subject; but they are rendered necessary, first,
from the fact that the English common law system really never had an appli-
cation to this country, and second, that the English Government has changed
the law, which is a very strong and established reason why we should place
our commercial marine upon an equal footing with hers. Why not give to
those who navigate the ocean as many inducements to do so as England has
done? Why not place them upon that great theatre where we are to have the
great contest for the supremacy of the commerce of the world? That is what
this bill seeks to do, and it asks no more.84
At this point, Sen. Butler (Dem., S.C.) threatened to "filibuster" because
this aid to shipowners must entail losses for shippers, as the insurer-liability
of common carriers is changed:
[W]e are called upon now ... to pass an act similar to that in force in an island
of ship-owners: for, of all the countries on earth, I suppose Great Britain has
more interest in relieving itself from liabilities upon the ocean than any other;
and I suppose that portion of the United States represented by the honorable
chairman of the committee may be in the same situation. But allow me to
remark that with regard to this liability, or the interest that is affected by this
liability, there are other parties whose interests are concerned besides mere
ship-owners. Now, the common law in regard to common carriers was a wise
one; and I venture to say that in Great Britain at this day you will not find
Parliament ready to abolish the liabilities of common carriers on land. They
have been willing, no doubt, to relax the law, so far as the liabilities of ship-
owners were concerned, because they are an island of ship-owners. On the
contrary, those of us who have to trust to the carriage of goods by ships may
9Id.
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have an adverse interest. I do not commit myself upon this subject; but I will
answer for one thing-that the wisest principle of the common law was that
when a loss occurred by the act of the common carrier, the onus should be
thrown upon the common carrier to exempt himself from liability by showing
that it was not an act of God or of a common enemy. Now, the whole of the
evidence must necessarily be with the captain and the crew; and if he can
exempt himself from liabilities by showing that it was the act of God or of a
common enemy, he has it in his power at all times to show that it was not by
his negligence that the fire originated. You are going upon the broad proposi-
tion that when there is a loss by fire there shall be no liability. It is a principle
which, if adopted, strikes deeply into an interest that concerns more persons
than ship-owners....
Those who trust their goods to ship-owners have great interests at stake, and
it is venturing a great to change the liability from that which the common law
prescribes. 5
Sen. Underwood (Whig, Ky.) then raised the issue of sectionalism, aver-
ring that the bill had nothing in it for the South and Central states-specifi-
cally, no reduction in freight rates:
Now, I should like before a bill is to be passed by which a practice of sixty
years' standing (a practice which has obtained ever since the Government
went into operation) is to be changed-I should like to be well informed as to
how it is to affect the great agricultural interests of the country, while we are
thus benefitting the mercantile interests. Can it be shown that freights will
come down? It seems to me that under the existing laws these merchants have
the power of indemnifying themselves against all risks by the insurance,
offices which have been alluded to. If it requires insurances to cover these
losses, I venture to say that they will be made up out of the freights charged
upon my constituents and the other producers of the country. If ship-owners
have to pay, they will indemnify themselves out of those who employ the ves-
sels. If they do not, they are the most benevolent and accommodating set of
gentlemen that can be found in the whole country-and I believe that is not
the peculiar characteristic of the mercantile interests. They are generally
thrifty men, guarding against all liabilities, and the insurance offices are pro-
vided for that very purpose.
Then the argument is that we cannot compete with our great rival upon the
ocean-with Great Britain-and that we must pass the first section of this bill
in order to enable us to enter into competition with her...
It ought to be shown that if this bill goes into operation it will so operate as to
reduce the freights and enable us to compete for the carrying trade with
England; because, under the regulation which controls the navigation of that
Id. at 715-16. There followed a brief intervention about Butler's charge of reckless and inconsider-
ate action; Sen. Foote (Whig, Vt.) spoke of the lengthy [unreported] hearings before the Commerce
Committee during which the bill was well considered and thoroughly matured. Id. at 716.
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country, they are now enabled to underwork us. I venture to say that in the
commercial transactions of the world it is the underworkings that most effec-
tually operate upon this part of the business. We know that in land carriage, in
the freights from the East to the West, that in railroads and steamboats, and in
wagons from Cumberland to Wheeling, or to Brownsville, it is the price which
the employer has to pay that regulates the matter in making the arrangements
for employing. Now, I want to be informed that, in consequence of those
favoring laws passed by the Parliament of Great Britain in reference to British
navigation, that ration is so beneficial as to enable the British commercial
marine to underwork in a great measure the American marine, and that by the
passage of this law it will enable the freights to come down so that we can
compete upon that basis....
You must show, in order to prove that we can then enter favorably into that
competition, that this legislation is necessary to bring down freights. For if
you cannot compete upon the score of economy in the transportation of tobac-
co, cotton, flour, pork, and other articles of that sort, my word for it, the man
who will do the work the cheapest and upon the best terms is employed,
whether it is his own national vessel or a foreign one.
We are acting entirely in the dark in reference to this matter. It seems to me
that we have a bill here of the most important character, affecting the great
agricultural interests of the country, and affecting these interests adversely and
disadvantageously, for the purpose of benefitting the commercial interests and
the ship-owners of this country.86
Senator Dickinson (Dem., N.Y.) took up Underwood's challenge, assert-
ing that any benefit to commerce must necessarily benefit agriculture; espe-
cially since the common law rule violates "the spirit of the age:"
[T]he advance and progress of commerce demand that there should be some
amelioration of this [common law] iron rule. You cannot benefit commerce
without benefitting agriculture. The common carriers, if they are relieved by
the operation of this bill, will receive benefits that will be felt in all the rami-
fications of society, and none will profit more than the agricultural interest. 7
Senator Rantoul (Dem., Mass.) supported Dickinson's reasoning in a
lengthy speech filled with statistics about shipowners and U.S. foreign trade,
to justify following British precedent:
We are bound to enact this provision into a law, because every act that is done
to benefit the navigation of this country benefits all the interests of the coun-
try in its ultimate effects, by its effects upon freights that are transported
between this and other countries. How is the rate of freights determined? The
Senator from Kentucky [Mr. Underwood] has asked, and fairly asked, what is
861d.
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the effect upon his constituency? What is the interest of the grower of tobac-
co, corn, pork, and other agricultural products, in this action in regard to the
shipping interests of this country ....
[A]lthough I consider the shipping interest a vast interest, still I consider that
the agricultural interest is much vaster and its welfare must be consulted by us
in endeavoring to make the change that we are now proposing to make. The
first mode in which we are to determine how this bill is to affect the rate of
freight is first to find out what supports, what determines the rates of freight.
It is the proportion between the quantity of shipping to carry the freight and
the quantity of freight to be carried. And how is that affected? Everything that
benefits your navigating interests, everything that makes the freight of your
merchants easier, cheaper, and safer in its carriage, will produce its beneficial
effect. You cannot add a thousand tons to your shipping without bringing
down the rates of your freight. You cannot impose upon your shipowner, or
allow to remain upon him, any liability without raising your rates of freight,
or at all events, preventing their reduction. The proportion may be very small;
but so far as the effect goes it is an effect upon him whose freight is carried,
but not ultimately upon the shipowner. He first feels the benefit of this change;
but how long does he feel it? Just so long as it takes to build more ships and
restore the proportion between the profit made out of that trade and the prof-
it of other branches of industry and business. Capital seeks investment in the
shape or shapes that are supposed to be the most profitable; and when you
build more ships then down go the rates of freight, and tobacco, and pork, and
corn are carried cheaper than before. Is there any escape from that reasoning?
I am really unable to discover any."8
Senator Rantoul concluded with the difference between the liability rule
for land carriage and for ocean carriage:
How is a ship-owner to endanger and risk the property of others that he may
have to carry without endangering his own property by the same negligence
or want of integrity? How is he to do it without a risk of the destruction of his
own property? How are his agents that are upon the ships, the master and
crew, to risk the property of others that the ship-owner may have placed under
their care, without great danger to their own lives? That is not the case with
the common carrier upon the land. He can risk the property of others without
there being any risk to his own person. Not so with the ship-owner; for then
his ships would be in danger.8 9
At this point, Senator Phelps (Whig, Vt.) proposed to do away with fur-
ther debate by a test vote; accordingly, he moved to lay the bill upon the
table (i.e., postpone further consideration). His motion was defeated, on a
vote of twenty in favor, twenty-eight against.9" In other words, there were
"1d. at 716-17.
"Id. at 717.
"1d.
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now five additional votes in support of the bill, as well as seven more in
opposition.
The basic decision having been made, there was an agreed amendment
concerning the liability of owners of chartered vessels.9' An amendment
broadening the exclusion from the bill of vessels on inland waters, however,
provoked further debate.92
Senator Seward (Whig, NY) joined the opposition to the amendment
because of the inconsistency in reducing uncertainty with limitation of
shipowner liability for foreign voyages but not for those on lakes and
rivers." Nevertheless, the inland exclusion was approved.94
The debate concluded with a discussion of exculpatory clauses in bills of
lading, which might make limitation legislation unnecessary, at least for the
protection of shipowners from cargo claims; The Lexington decision was
cited for the proposition that the shipper must have consented to the excul-
patory clause, and that adding such clauses after shipment was not effec-
tive. 5 Senator Phelps pointed out that the limitation act would not affect bill
of lading clauses, bringing to a close that aspect of the discussion.96
3. Enactment and Approval
Senator Hamlin's bill was enacted on March 3, 1851, the last day of the
second session of the Thirty-First Congress.97 It was bundled with appropri-
91Id.
921d.93Id.
'Id at 717-18. This exclusion was later removed. Act of June 19, 1886, ch. 421 § 4, 24 Stat. 80.
95Cong. Globe, 31st Cong., 2d Sess. 718 (1851).
d.
97Act of Mar. 3, 1851, ch. 43, 9 Stat. 635. Section One deals with non-liability for fire not caused by
vessel owners' design or neglect. Section Two deals with non-liability for valuable articles carried with-
out notice to the master. Sections Three and Four deal with general liability:
Sec. 3. And be it further enacted, That the liability of the owner or owners of any ship or vessel,
for any embezzlement, loss, or destruction, by the master, officers, mariners, passengers, or any
other person or persons, of any property, goods, or merchandize, shipped or put on board of such
ship or vessel, or for any loss, damage, or injury by collision, or for any act, matter, or thing, loss,
damage, or forfeiture, done, occasioned, or incurred, without the privity or knowledge of such
owner or owners, shall in no case exceed the amount or value of the interest of such owner or own-
ers respectively, in such ship or vessel, and her freight then pending.
Sec. 4. And be it further enacted, That if any such embezzlement, loss, or destruction, shall be suf-
fered by several freighters or owners of goods, wares, or merchandize, or any property whatever,
on the same voyage, and the whole value of the ship or vessel, and her freight for the voyage, shall
not be sufficient to make compensation to each of them, they shall receive compensation from the
owner or owners of the ship or vessel, in proportion to their respective losses; and for that purpose
the said freighters and owners of the property, and the owner or owners of the ship or vessel, or
any of them, may take the appropriate proceedings in any court, for the purpose of apportioning
the sum for which the owner or owners of the ship or vessel may be liable amongst the parties
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ation bills for the Departments of State, Treasury, Interior, War, Navy and
the Post Office, along with legislation on postal rates, customs duties, light-
houses, territories and land claims. The House of Representatives promptly
concurred in the Senate bill, and, later that day, President Millard Fillmore
manifested approval with his signature.9" The legislation would remain
undisturbed through the Civil War.
IV
APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL LIMITATION OF
LIABILITY ACT
A. The City of Norwich Case
Section Three of the 1851 Limitation Act simply states that the liability of
shipowners "shall in no case exceed the amount or value of the interest of
such owner."" Section Four provides that claimants "shall receive compen-
entitled thereto. And it shall be deemed a sufficient compliance with the requirements of this act,
on the part of such owner or owners, if he or they shall transfer his or their interest in such vessel
and freight, for the benefit of such claimants, to a trustee, to be appointed by any court of compe-
tent jurisdiction, to act as such trustee for the person or persons who may prove to be legally enti-
tled thereto, from and after which transfer, all claims and proceedings against the owner or own-
ers shall cease.
"'Millard Fillmore (1800-1874) was born in extreme poverty in the Finger Lakes region of New York.
Without any formal schooling, he was apprenticed at age fifteen to wool carders at a textile mill. During
apprenticeship, he was occasionally permitted to attend a one-room school. Voluminous reading led to a
teaching position at age twenty-two in Buffalo, where he began to read law. He was admitted to the New
York Bar in 1823, and became a political protege of Thurlow Tweed, initially in the Anti-Masonic Party
and later as a Whig. Fillmore was elected to the New York Assembly in 1829 as an Anti-Mason and served
three terms. In 1832, he was elected to Congress as an Anti-Mason. He did not seek reelection in 1834,
but was elected again to the Congress, as a Whig, in 1836, and reelected in 1838 and 1840. He became
leader of the Whigs in the House and Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee. He was defeated in
1844 in a campaign for Governor of New York, but elected Comptroller in 1847. In 1848, the Whigs pro-
posed to nominate for President of the United States Zachary Taylor, a popular general with no known
political views. A slaveowner from Louisiana, Taylor was seen as needing a running mate from the north-
east who did not own slaves, and Fillmore was chosen as the Whig candidate for Vice President. President
Taylor served only sixteen months before falling ill and dying. On July 9, 1850, Fillmore became
President, in the midst of the divisive Senate debates over the Kansas - Nebraska bill. President Fillmore's
approval of a new fugitive slave law, (part of the Compromise of 1850), cost him renomination in 1852.
After a year touring Europe, Fillmore returned to contest the Whig nomination in 1856, losing it to anoth-
er general, Winfield Scott. Fillmore then joined the bigots of the Know-Nothing Party - formally, the
American Party - as their candidate for the presidency. He carried only Maryland. Fillmore supported
Lincoln and the Republican Party in 1860, McClellan and the Democrats in 1864. See R. Rayback,
Millard Fillmore (1959) and E. Smith, The Presidencies of Zachary Taylor and Millard Fillmore (1988).
'"46 U.S.C. app. § 183.
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sation from the owner or owners of the ship or vessel, in proportion to their
respective losses."'" That section then, mysteriously, provides that both
shipowners and loss or damage claimants, "may take the appropriate pro-
ceedings in any court, for the purpose of apportioning the sum for which the
owner or owners of the ship or vessel may be liable amongst the parties enti-
tled thereto."'' There is no further indication of the precise court, federal or
state, in which this is to occur. Nor is there any indication of the type of juris-
diction, law, equity or admiralty, from which procedures are to be drawn.
Two decades passed before the Supreme Court heard its first case under
the 1851 Limitation Act. Today, we cannot be sure why it took so long for
the normally litigious shipping industry to bring such a dispute to the High
Court. The interval included civil war and reconstruction. Another deterrent
might have been the absence of readily ascertainable procedures for taking
advantage of the substantial privilege conferred by Congress on shipowners.
In any event, the case of Norwich & New York Transportation Co. v. Wright
(The City of Norwich) 2 brought to the Court the issue of whether the Act
applied to collision cases, and the Court, on March 4, 1872, held that it did.
Shortly afterward, on May 6, 1872, the Court added to the Admiralty Rules
promulgated in 1845, Rules 54, 55, 56 and 57, specifying the procedure for
use in cases invoking the Limitation Act.' 3
'"Id. § 184.
1Old.
'°80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 104, 1998 AMC 2061 (1872).
'
0IThese were presumably the work of Justice Bradley. Joseph P. Bradley (1813-1892) was born on a
farm near Albany, N.Y. He was educated at home until the age of 20 when he entered Rutgers College, from
which he graduated in 1837. He then read law for two years and, having married the daughter of the Chief
Justice, he was admitted to the New Jersey Bar in 1839. He practiced railroad law for the next 30 years.
Originally a Whig, Bradley became a stalwart Grant Republican. His selection in 1870 for the U.S.
Supreme Court was over-shadowed by the desire of President Grant to appoint a justice who would over-
turn The Legal Tender Cases, 75 U.S. (11 Wall.) 603 (1870). Bradley voted to overturn in Knox v. Lee, 79
U.S. 457 (1871). In 1877, he served on the electoral commission to decide the contested presidential elec-
tion of 1876. When the only independent member of the Supreme Court (Davis) resigned, Bradley was
appointed to the Commission as the fifth Justice. Electoral votes of Florida, Louisiana, Oregon and South
Carolina had been challenged, Bradley voted with the seven other Republicans on the 15 member
Commission to award the presidency to Republican Rutherford B. Hayes by an electoral college vote of
185 to 184 for the Democrat Tilden who had a 250,000 vote popular majority out of 8,300,000 votes cast.
Some of Bradley's decisions are today considered controversial: He wrote the majority opinion in The Civil
Rights Cases, 107 U.S. 3 (1883), holding unconstitutional the 1875 Civil Rights Act. He also expanded the
Eleventh Amendment to immunize states from law suits in federal courts, Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1
(1890), and his concurrence in Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1873) still enrages feminists because of
its relegation of women to, "the noble and benign offices of wife and mother." Nevertheless, he wrote other
important admiralty decisions: Providence & N.Y. S.S. Co. v. Hill Mfg. Co., 109 U.S. 578 (1883); The
Scotland, 105 U.S. 24, 1999 AMC 895 (1882); The North Star, 106 U.S. 17, 1999 AMC 1503 (1882);
Butler v. Boston S.S. Co., 130 U.S. 527 (1888); Cope v. Vallette Dry Dock Co., 119 U.S. 525 (1886); The
Belgenland, 114 U.S. 355 (1885); The Benefactor, 103 U.S. 239 (1880); The Alabama and the Game-Cock,
92 U.S. 695 (1875); and The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. 558, 1996 AMC 2372 (1874). See C. Fairman, Mr.
Justice Bradley in Mr. Justice (A. Dunham & P. Kurland eds. 1964).
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The collision of the steamer City of Norwich with the schooner General
S. Van Vliet would be in front of many courts for twenty years.'" It took
place in Long Island Sound near New York Harbor on the night of April 16,
1866. The City of Norwich was proceeding east toward New Haven at twelve
knots, while the schooner was proceeding south at three to four knots, beat-
ing against a head wind. 5 Under the starboard hand rule-an established
custom of the sea as well as a newly promulgated regulation'---the City of
Norwich was the burdened vessel, obliged to keep out of the way of the Van
Vliet. The Van Vliet sank immediately after collision, a total loss of ship and
cargo. The City of Norwich caught fire when sea water surged into the
engine room and, in half an hour, she also sank in 20 fathoms, a total loss of
the cargo. The steamer was salvaged and repaired three weeks later, albeit at
great expense. 7
In the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, the
owners of the Van Vliet brought an action against those of the City of
Norwich, seeking damages for loss of their schooner and her cargo.' °0
Owners of cargo aboard the steamer sued the City of Norwich in an action
"°The litigation began in the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut, where the owners of
the Van Viet obtained a judgement against the owners of the City of Norwich for the loss of the Van Vijet
and her cargo. Wright v. Norwich & N.Y. Transp. Co., 30 F Cas. 685 (D. Conn. 1867) (No. 18,087).
Before judgment could be passed in that action, owners of cargo aboard the City of Norwich arrested the
steamship (which had been raised and repaired) in the Eastern District of New York. Place v. City of
Norwich, 19 F. Cas. 792 (E.D.N.Y. 1866) (No. 11,202). Owners of the City of Norwich then sued their
insurer on a fire insurance policy, and prevailed over the insurer's claim that the loss was marine and not
fire, Norwich & N.Y. Transp. Co. v. Western Mass. Ins. Co., 18 F. Cas. 447 (C.C.D. Conn. 1868) (No. 10,
363). In New York, the owners of cargo aboard the City of Norwich prevailed against the bill of lading's
exculpatory clause (perils of the sea), 5 F. Cas. 780 (EDNY 1869) (No. 2,760) and against its unit limi-
tation of liability ($100 per package), The City of Norwich, 5 F. Cas. 781 (S.D.N.Y. 1870) (No. 2,761).
The Connecticut decision was affirmed in the same year as to the liability of the City of Norwich, 30 F
Cas. 685 (C.C.D. Conn. 1870) (No. 18,087).
A new round of litigation then began on the question of the value of the City of Norwich in limitation
proceedings in New York, 5 F. Cas. 782 (E.D.N.Y. 1873) (No. 2,762). The $70,000 valuation of the
repaired vessel was cut down to the value of the sunken wreck ($2,500), 18 F. Cas. 436 (E.D.N.Y. 1875)
(No. 10,360). There followed a battle over costs, 18 F. Cas. 439 (E.D.N.Y. 1878) (No. 10,361). In an unre-
ported decision, the Eastern District next proposed to distribute the proceeds, and affirmance of the ear-
lier decrees followed, 18 F Cas. 440 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1879) (No. 10,362), the circuit court holding also that
the fire insurance proceeds ($49,000) need not be added to the limitation fund. In this, the second appeal,
the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court by a 5 to 4 vote, The City of Norwich, 118 U.S. 468, 1998
AMC 2077 (1886).
The City of Norwich was held in sole fault for a collision with a tug and tow in the East River in 1874.
The City of Norwich, 5 F. Cas. 786 (E.D.N.Y. 1875) (No. 2,763).
11180 U.S. at 114-16. See also the circuit court's opinion, 18 F Cas. 447 (C.C.D. Conn. 1868) (No. 10,
363).
'"Act of Apr. 29, 1864, Ch. 69, 13 Stat. 58, arts. 12 and 14.
1080 U.S. at 107.
"Supra note 104.
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in rem in United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York.'IN
In the Connecticut action, the steamer's owners argued unsuccessfully that
the schooner was solely at fault because she had no side lights or running
lights. However, witnesses aboard a vessel astern of the City of Norwich had
seen the lights of the Van Viet at about the time of the collision,"' and the
court gave judgment for the Van Viet to the full value of the vessel and her
cargo."' After the decree had been entered, the owners of the City of
Norwich sought limitation of their liability, calling the attention of the court
in Connecticut to the litigation in New York, and petitioning the court in
Connecticut to limit their liability to the owners of the Van Vliet to a pro-
portionate share of the value of the City of Norwich (assessed after her sink-
ing, but before her salvage)."2 The Van Vliet's owners argued that the
Limitation Act did not apply to the claims of those who owned the other ves-
sel in a collision (in this case, the Van Viet) and her cargo, but only, in such
cases, to claims of those who owned cargo aboard the vessel seeking limita-
tion (in this case, the City of Norwich). Alternatively, the schooner's owners
argued that, even if the Limitation Act did apply to collision claims like
theirs, a district court lacked jurisdiction to afford a shipowner relief under
the Act."3
The Connecticut court rejected the shipowner's first argument but accept-
ed the second. "4 On appeal, the United States Circuit Court for the District
of Connecticut reversed, holding that cases of collision were not covered by
the Act."5 A writ of error brought the case to the Supreme Court, which
afffirmed, without dissent."6
Justice Bradley wrote for the Court, reviewing the history of the Act and
similar legislation abroad." 7 His opinion then stated what the Court deemed
to be the purpose of the statute: "The great object of the law was to encour-
age ship-building and to induce capitalists to invest money in this branch of
industry.""8 The court could therefore find no justification for treating colli-
sion claims as excluded from the Act. In the Court's view, innocent collision
claimants as well as innocent cargo owners "stand on an equality with regard
'"See supra note 104.
"O180 U.S. at 115.
"Ild. at 107, $19,975 for the schooner and $1,921 for her cargo.
"old. at 108.
131d.
"'Id.
15Id
.
16J. Strong did not take part in the case. Id. at 128.
"'80 U.S. at 116-19, going back to Grotius and the 1681 Ordonnance de la Marine, and including the
English statutes of 1734, 1786 and 1813, as well as the statutes of Massachusetts (1819) and Maine
(1821).
1180 U.S. at 120.
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to each other if they arise from the same cause.""9 Because the claims
against the City of Norwich and her owners exceeded greatly the value of the
steamer and her freight, the Limitation Act applied. 21
The Supreme Court ordered the case remanded for proceedings in the
Eastern District of New York, where the fund for limitation (i.e., the vessel)
was located.2 ' (The amount of that fund would be the subject of fifteen more
years of litigation).'22 In its order, the Court prescribed procedures for the
court below.' 23 For use in future cases, virtually identical directions appeared
in the new Admiralty Rules, which were promulgated a few months later.'24
As for the meaning of "appropriate proceedings in any court," the Supreme
Court made clear its preference for the federal admiralty court, "Now, no
court is better adapted than a court of admiralty to administer precisely such
relief [apportionment].' 25 The rules for administering the Limitation Act,
promulgated in the wake of The City of Norwich, survived intact the 1920
and 1948 revisions of the Supreme Court Admiralty Rules and emerged in
1966 as the substance of Rule F to the Supplementary Rules of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, which tracks the language of the current version
of the Limitation Act. 26
"Id. at 122.
'
2Id. at 126 and 128.
2
'Id. at 124 and 128.
"See supra note 104.
'"According to the Court:
The proper course of proceeding for obtaining the benefit of the act would seem to be this:
When a libel for damage is filed, either against the ship in rem or the owners in personam, the lat-
ter (whether with or without an answer to the merits) should file a proper petition for an appor-
tionment of the damages according to the statute, and should pay into court (if the vessel or its
proceeds is not already there), or give due stipulation for, such sum as the court may, by proper
inquiry, find to be the amount of the limited liability; or else surrender the ship and freight by
assigning them to a trustee in the manner pointed out in the fourth section. Having done this, the
ship-owner will be entitled to a monition against all persons to appear and intervene pro interesse
suo, and to an order restraining the prosecution of other suits. If an action should be brought in a
State court the ship-owner should file a libel in admiralty, with a like surrender or deposit of the
fund, and either plead the fact in bar in the State court or procure an order from the District Court
to restrain the further prosecution of the suit. The court having jurisdiction of the case, under and
by virtue of the act of Congress, would have the right to enforce its jurisdiction and to ascertain
and determine the rights of the parties.
Id. at 125.
12180 U.S. at xii-xiv. Rule 54 describes the shipowner's petition or libel and the establishment of the
fund, and requiring claimants to prove their claims; and the issuance of an order to restrain the further
prosecution of suits against the owners. Rule 55 describes the claims process and the pro-rata distribution
of the fund. Rule 56 describes the method for contesting the right to limitation or claim. Rule 57 describes
venue in the federal court.
12580 U.S. at 123.
2146 U.S.C. app. § 185.
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Not long after The City of Norwich settled vital details about the scope
and implementation of the Limitation Act, two cases presented the Court
with the opportunity to confirm its constitutionality, as an exercise of
Congressional power to regulate interstate commerce. In Lord v. Goodall,
Nelson & Perkins Steamship Co.,"7 the act was held constitutional as applied
to a vessel lost while voyaging between ports of a single state, and in
Providence & New York Steamship Co. v. Hill Manufacturing Co."8 the act
was held constitutional as applied to claims after a ship, having completed
her voyage from Providence to New York, burned at her unloading pier. In
The Scotland, 9 the Court held that the Act entitled the foreign owners of a
liner serving New York and Liverpool to limitation for liability from her col-
lision with an American ship on the high seas.
B. The Case of the North Star: When Both Vessels Are To Blame
In another collision case, the Supreme Court devised the Single Liability
Rule, for collision cases where two or more limitation proceedings might be
simultaneous. The case of The North Star3° involved a collision between two
steamships in a meeting situation, one leaving, the other entering New York
Harbor south of Sandy Hook. The outbound Ella Warley sank and was a total
loss; the inbound North Star was badly damaged, but survived to be arrest-
ed in an action brought by the Ella Warley's owners. The North Star's own-
ers retaliated with a cross-libel against the Ella Warley's owners, and the
libel and cross-libel were consolidated for trial. In an unreported decision,
the district court found the North Star solely to blame. On appeal, however,
the circuit court found both vessels blameworthy and divided the damages
equally, under the American rule then in force,' rendering a decree in favor
of the Ella Warley's owners for the amount by which their damages exceed-
ed one-half the total damages of both parties.
Neither owner petitioned for limitation, but both appealed, and the
Supreme Court found the Ella Warley's total loss put her owners in the same
position as would their filing of a limitation petition.' (At the time The North
Star was decided, an owner was permitted to delay seeking limitation until
after being held liable.) The Court speculated that the North Star would prob-
27102 U.S. 541 (1880).
'28109 U.S. 578 (1883).
29105 U.S. 24 (1886).
130106 U.S. 17 (1882) (per J. Bradley, for a unanimous Court).
''18 F. Cas. 381 (C.C. S.D.N.Y. 1871) (No. 10, 331), aff'd, 106 U.S. at 20, referring to The Schooner
Catharine v. Dickinson, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 170 (1855), overruled, United States v. Reliable Transfer Co.,
421 U.S. 397, 1975 AMC 541 (1975).
132106 U.S. at 29.
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ably not be entitled to limit because the faulty positioning of her sidelights
was attributable to her owners and was a contributing cause of the collision.'33
The Ella Warley's owners contended that, as their vessel was a total loss, the
Limitation Act protected them against any liability to the North Star's own-
ers and that they, on the other hand, were entitled to recover half their dam-
ages from the North Star's owners. The Ella Worley's owners also argued that
the North Star's owners were not entitled to any deduction in respect of the
North Star's damages, i.e., that limitation should be applied before a balance
was struck between the damages assessment of the two vessels."3 That con-
tention was flatly rejected by the Supreme Court, which affirmed the decree
of the circuit court as written.'35 The Court thus established the rule that, in
both-to-blame collision cases, limitation can occur only after a balance has
been struck, and then, in the absence of privity or knowledge, the limiting
calculation is to be applied to the balance which would otherwise be owing
by one owner to the other. The rule was stated by the Court as follows:
When this resulting liability of one party to the other has been ascertained,
then, and not before, would seem to be the proper time to apply the rule of
limited responsibility, if the party decreed to pay is entitled to it. It will enable
him to avoid payment pro tanto of the balance found against him.36
While the rule of The North Star was adopted at a time when damages were
divided equally in both-to-blame collisions, regardless of the respective
degrees of blame, it remains valid under the current rule of proportional fault
established in Reliable Transfer v. United States.'37
It is apparent that the judicial goal is a single judgment, essentially a
shortcut, where one judgment resolves all issues-not only those relating to
liability, but also those relating to the right of each owner to limit, and to the
constitution and distribution of the fund. Because of the difficulty sometimes
encountered today in achieving this goal in a single court, solutions must be
devised for situations in which only a part of the total collision-limitation
problem has been referred to a court.
33Id.
'
T Id. at 28.
'
351d. at 29. See also The Manitoba, 122 U.S. 97 (1897) where the rule of The North Star was applied
to a both-to-blame collision with very unequal damages ($85,818 and $7,470 respectively).
106 U.S. at 20.
'11421 U.S. 397 (1975), overruling The Schooner Catharine v. Dickinson, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 170
(1855).
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C. Limiting Collision Liability in U.S. Courts
Like the case from which it emerged, the North Star model was designed
for collisions in which, because both vessels were to blame, their damages
were divided evenly. The North Star model also presupposed that the claims
of third parties had already been paid by each vessel respectively, that these
claims were included in each vessel's collision damage claim,'3s and that any
amounts received by the owners, in litigation or settlement, would be added
to each vessel's limitation fund.'39
1. Single Limitation Fund
In In re Petition of Diesel Tanker A. C. Dodge,"4 two laden tankers had col-
lided in the Delaware River near Philadelphia. The Dodge exploded and
sank, killing eight of her crew; the Michael was badly damaged, with three
deaths among her crew. There were substantial faults attributable to both
vessels, so the district court's decision that both were to blame meant, at that
time, an equal division of damages, plus joint and several liability of both
vessels to third parties with both personal injury and cargo claims. The
owner of the Michael settled the claims of those with cargo aboard the
Dodge, as well as most of the personal injury and death claims against the
Michael. The Michael paid $57,000 to the widow of the master of the
Dodge, on her claim of $118,500. The total of Michael's collision damages
for hull, detention and third party settlements amounted to $300,000 more
than the total loss claims of the Dodge.4 ' The owner and operator of the
Dodge petitioned to limit liability; the owner of the Michael did not.
On appeal, the issue before the court concerned $61,500 awarded by the
commissioner to the widow of the master of the Dodge from the Dodge's
limitation fund. The owners and operators of the Dodge objected to the dis-
trict court's judgment, confirming the commissioner's decision, that the
owner of the Michael was not responsible for some portion of the widow's
recovery. The court of appeals was not persuaded, viewing the Dodge's
3 The Albert Dumois, 177 U.S. 240 (1900), discussed infra in text at notes 165-67.
390'Brien v. Miller, 168 U.S. 287 (1897).
"-282 F 2d 86, 1961 AMC 233 (2d Cir. 1980).
"'Id. at 88. See also Great Lakes Towing & Dock Co. v. MJT Robert Watt Miller, 957 F.2d 1575, 1992
AMC 2310 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Chevron Transport Co. V. Great Lakes Dedge & Dock Co.,
506 U.S. 981 (1992). For a collision on the St. John's River at Jacksonville in 1975, a tanker and a dredge
were both found to blame. The tanker's petition for limitation was denied, and fault was apportioned 70%
to the tanker and 30% to the dredge. In this, the third appeal, the court allowed contribution from the
tanker owner for the amount, in excess of the dredge's proportion of liability, of a judgment for the estate
of a deceased member of the dredge's crew, even though the tanker owner had peviously settled with the
estate.
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objections as an attempt to get around The North Star. In his opinion for the
court, Judge Waterman described the position taken by the owners and oper-
ators of the Dodge as follows: "that the Dodge, by virtue of its election to
limit liability, insulated from having to pay the Michael one half of the dif-
ference between its loss and the Michael's loss, should be permitted to
require the Michael to pay some portion of the Dodge's obligation to Mrs.
Elliott."'' 42 The court refused to hold the Michael liable, adhering to The
North Star requirement that limitation of liability should not occur until
after the balance of the two ships' collision damages has been struck. The
court was not dissuaded by a prediction from the owner and operator of the
Dodge that application of the rule of The North Star would lead to great
uncertainty for innocent claimants in cases where the American rule of joint
and several liability was not applied. The court reasoned that requiring fur-
ther payments from the non-limiting vessel, "would constitute an improper
nullification of valid settlements."'43 In the end, the court stuck with The
North Star principle, and the Dodge had to pay the remaining portion of the
widow's claim from the Dodge limitation fund.
In Petition of Oskar Tiedemann and Co.,'" a tanker, the Mission San
Francisco, collided with a cargo ship, the Elna II, on the Delaware River.
The tanker exploded and sank; the cargo ship was badly damaged. Both ves-
sels petitioned to limit, and all claims were made in both petitions. Finding
both vessels to blame, the district court denied a petition of the United States
as owner of the tanker, but granted that of the owners of the cargo ship.' 5 The
claims against Elna II exceeded $800,000, but the court eventually approved
a limitation fund of $195,000.'" The United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit affirmed.'"
11d. at 89.
11Id., citing The Chattahoochee, 173 U.S. 540 (1879). This case established the rule recognizing, in a
collision case, the indirect liability of the carrier to its own cargo because of joint and several liability.
Contrast the Brussels Collision Convention of 1910, which provides for several liability only, so that a
carrier (having no liability to cargo by reason of the negligent navigation defense) will recover from the
non-carrier only the proportionate contribution to the collision. See art. IV. International Convention for
the Unification of Certain Rules of Law with Respect to Collision Between Vessels, adopted at Brussels,
Sept. 23, 1910, and in force Mar. 1, 1913. 212 Consol. Treaty Ser. 178, reprinted at 6 Benedict on
Admiralty Doc. 3-2 (F. Wiswall ed., 7th rev. ed. 2000).
'"Petition of Oskar Tiedemann & Co., 179 F Supp. 227 (D. Del. 1959), aff'd, 289 F.2d 237 (3d Cir.
1961).
"'The owner and operator of the tanker were denied limitation because the court found that she had
violated two statutory rules of the road for navigating inland waters, that obliging vessels to keep to star-
board in narrow channels, 33 U.S.C. § 2009 (Rule 9), and that obliging a vessel to respond to another's
signal in anticipation of passing head-on and port to port, 33 U.S.C. § 2034(a) (Rule 34(a)). 179 F. Supp.
at 231-32.
"See Petition of Oskar Tiedemann & Co., 367 F. 2d 498, 502, 1966 AMC 1934 (3rd Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 386 U.S. 932 (1967).
"Petition of Oskar Tiedemann & Co., 289 F.2d 237, 1961 AMC 1878 (3rd Cir. 1961).
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In a subsequent appeal,'48 the owners of the cargo ship objected to the dis-
trict court's decision to revisit its decree fixing the limitation fund, to impose
liability in full for seamen's claims of maintenance and cure for injuries sus-
tained in the collision. The court of appeals found that the court below had
erred in reopening the matter of the freighter owner's liability, even though
the seamen's claims represented a liability that was not subject to limitation.
For the court of appeals, the limitation decree was final.'49
In Complaint of Seiriki Kisen Kaisha,' the Stena (5,940 gross tons) col-
lided with the Seiryu (17,151 gross tons) in waters eight and a half miles off
the coast of Cuba. The Seiryu went down, with loss of cargo but no loss of
life; the Stena was badly damaged. The Brussels Collision Convention of
1910'15 governed, obliging the court to assign fault proportionately, and dic-
tating several liability, rather than joint and several liability.5 2
Each vessel was clearly aware of the other's presence, yet they managed
to collide at right angles while both were at full speed; the Seiryu being on
a crossing course (and therefore the give-way ship), while the Stena was the
stand-on vessel.'53 The Seiryu's watch officer did not attempt to determine
the risk of collision, either visually or by radar, and somehow reached the
erroneous conclusion that the Stena was on a parallel course.'54 Nevertheless,
about two to three minutes before the collision, the Seiryu turned to port,
without signal to the Stena. This turn brought the Seiryu directly across the
extended course line of the Stena, and was found to have been the immedi-
ate cause of the collision.'55
Just prior to the accident, the Stena's watch-officer had allowed the look-
out to go below, while the watch officer meanwhile occupied himself with
non-urgent navigational tasks. The vessel's automatic pilot was engaged.
Aboard the Stena, therefore, nobody was watching the approaching Seiryu,
and, when she turned toward the Stena, no warning signal was sounded by
the Stena, an omission found to be a contributory cause of the collision. 6
Nevertheless, the court found the Seiryu to be more at fault, in terms of both
culpability and causation, because of its status as the give-way vessel and
"'Petition of Oskar Tiedemann & Co., 367 F. 2d 498, 1966 AMC 1934 (3rd Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 932 (1967), rev'g 236 F. Supp. 895 (D. Del. 1964).
111367 F.2d at 502-03.
'1629 F. Supp. 1374, 1986 AMC 913 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
1'Id. See supra note 143. Both Japan (Seiryu) and Cayman Islands (Stena) were signatories of the
1910 Brussels Collision Convention. (Cuba, rejected as the territorial waters state, is not a signatory.)
15629 F Supp. at 1392-95.
'1629 F Supp. at 1378.
"AId.
11Id. at 1381.
"
6 Id. at 1380.
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because of its unexplained last-minute course change. The court therefore
assigned 60% of the fault to the Seiryu and 40% to the Stena."'5
The owners and bareboat charterers of both vessels petitioned for limita-
tion under the 1851 Act. The court denied limitation to the owner and oper-
ator of the Seiryu, but granted it to the owners of the Stena. The Seiryu inter-
ests were denied limitation because they had failed to prove that the accident
was not caused by their privity or knowledge; that is, they had failed to prove
her crew, particularly the watch officer, competent. The watch officer held
only a class B Korean license, although the applicable regulations required
all deck officers to hold class A licenses. The differences between these two
licenses related to training in electronic navigation equipment. They also
related to proficiency in the English language, and the only radar manuals
on board the vessel were written in Japanese and English.'58
Cargo on the Stena was not damaged, but a general average had been
declared.'59 Cargo on the Seiryu was lost when she sank, but its owners could
recover damages from the Stena. Recovery by the owners of Seiryu's cargo
from the owner of the Stena was limited by the Convention of 1910, in pro-
portion to the Stena's 40% contributory fault, and subject to Stena's limita-
tion of liability under the 1910 Act."6 The total loss of Seiryu ($8.5 million),
and that of her cargo ($16.5 million), was balanced against the hull damage
to Stena ($1.7 million) and minimal damage to her cargo, in light of the 60-
40 division of damages.
The court granted Stena's limitation petition, but denied Seiryu's, so
Seiryu's cargo owners could recover from Stena 40% of their damages to the
limit of the fund, while Stena's cargo interests could recover 60% of their
general average contributions from Seiryu, without limitation. 6' Ultimately,
the case amounted to a financial victory for Seiryu, despite the denial of lim-
itation. Seiryu's cargo owners took 40% of the $11,295,000 in Stena's limi-
tation fund, leaving $6,577,000 for the claims of Seiryu's owners. By the
rule of The North Star, the Stena's right to limitation is recognized only after
the balance of losses between the two vessels has been struck. The result was
therefore a decree in favor of Seiryu owners in the amount of $1,750,000. 162
"
57 d. at 1382.
"'Id. at 1388-90.
'"
9Id. at 1391.
1id. at 1392.
"'Of course, Seiryu's cargo would also be subject under its bills of lading to the COGSA defenses
(e.g., negligent navigation) and unit limitation, ($500 per package); accordingly, cargo interests settled
their claim against Seiryu for $1 million. Id. at 1391-92.
112 d. at 1392. "Innocent" cargo takes before "guilty" claimants. See The Mauch Chunk, 154 F. 182
(2d Cir. 1907), for the equitable rule of subordination whereby satisfaction of claimants without clean
hands, such as a both-to-blame vessel owner, is postponed until all innocent claimants are paid in full.
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Had limitation been granted to Seiryu, the $1,750,000 from Stena would
then have bolstered Seiryu's limitation fund,'63 but Seiryu's petition was
denied. This case is especially instructive because others involving a single
limitation fund do not provide the financial details to determine completely
the consequences for the interests of each colliding ship.'
2. Two (or more) Limitation Funds
In The Albert Dumois,'65 the Argo, descending the Mississippi River at 20
m.p.h., collided with the Albert Dumois, which had been ascending the river
at 9 m.p.h. The Argo sank; the Albert Dumois survived. Both vessels were
found to blame. Owners of both vessels petitioned to limit liability, and both
petitions were granted. Before the Supreme Court were the death claims for
passengers on the Argo, which had been made only against the non-carrier,
the Albert Dumois.'11 Reaffirming the rule pronounced in the The North Star,
the Court held that the court of appeals had not erred in ordering that the
payments to those claiming on behalf of the dead passengers should be
deducted from both limitation funds. Writing for the Court, Justice Brown
noted that:
We held [in The North Star] that the Admiralty rule that, where both vessels
are in fault, they must bear the damages equally, applied, and that the one suf-
fering least should be decreed to pay to the other the amount necessary to
make them equal, namely, one half the difference between the respective loss-
es sustained, and that when this resulting liability of one party to the other has
been ascertained, then, and not before, was the proper time to apply the rule
of limited responsibility, if the party decreed to pay is entitled to it. 167
In Petition of Bloomfield Steamship Co.,168 successful petitions to limit lia-
bility by the owners of both vessels involved in a collision, and claims by the
'
63See supra note 143.
"See, e.g., Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 597, 1963 AMC 846 (1963) (actual pay-
ments rather than statutory compensation amounts used to determine third party injury claims). In Guillot
v. Cenac Towing Co., 366 F 2d 898, 1966 AMC 2685 (5th Cir. 1966), the Fifth Circuit stated the princi-
ple that the actual payouts to third parties rather than the potential indemnification claims should be
included in the claims on the limitation fund. The case involved an explosion rather than a collision. See
also Empire Seafoods v. Anderson, 398 F. 2d 204, 1968 AMC 2664 (5th Cir. 1968) (limitation eventual-
ly denied for shrimp boat's allision with bridge). Cargill Grain Co. v. Buffalo Barge Towing Corp., 1941
AMC 122 (S.D.N.Y. 1940), involved the collision of two barges, with resulting hull and cargo claims.
Both owners petitioned for limitation. The court marshalled the funds so that innocent cargo with a claim
against only one fund was paid out of that fund, while claimants who could be paid out of either fund
were paid out of the other, which paid more.
6177 U.S. 240 (1900).
' Id. at 255.
" 
7 d. at 256. Chief Justice Fuller and Justice Peckham dissented, without opinions.
1-'422 F.2d 728, 1970 AMC 521 (2d Cir. 1970).
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owners of cargo lost aboard one of them, left the courts to dispose of a non-
carrier's claim for indemnification from the carrier. The dispute arose from
a collision between the American flagged Lucile Bloomfield and the
Norwegian flagged Ronda in international waters off Le Havre, France.
Only slightly damaged in the collision, the Lucile Bloomfield continued on
her way; the severely damaged Ronda managed to enter Le Havre, but she
capsized and sank at a pier the following day, a total loss of both vessel and
cargo.'69 The owners of cargo that went down with the Ronda promptly sued
the owners of both vessels in New York. 7° Two weeks later, the American
owners of the Lucile petitioned to limit their liability with respect to the col-
lision.'7 ' The owners of the Ronda's cargo then presented their claims in the
Lucile Bloomfield limitation action, but the owners of the Ronda did not,
opting instead to sue the owners of the Lucile in the English High Court of
Justice. Later, when the owners of the Lucile sued the owners of the Ronda
in a federal court in Louisiana, that action was transferred to the Southern
District of New York, and, on the next day, the owners of the Ronda filed
their own petition for limitation in the Southern District.'72
The owners of cargo lost aboard Ronda settled with the owners of the
Ronda, but not with the owners of the Lucile. Trial in the English court of the
collision action (Ronda v. Lucile) took place before trial in the federal court
in New York (Lucile v. Ronda), but the judgments handed down by both courts
were that both vessels were to blame. The English court apportioned the dam-
ages fifty-fifty. In New York, the owners of both the Ronda and the Lucile
were allowed to limit their liabilities pursuant to the 1851 Act. The owners of
cargo lost aboard Ronda were allowed to collect from Lucile, as joint tortfea-
sor, the remainder of their damages ($1,663,000), that is, after subtraction of
91d. at 729-30. The Ronda, outbound from New York with military cargo for Le Havre (cargo value
$1,863,000) collided at the pilot station with Lucile Bloomfield (hereinafter Lucile). outbound from Le
Havre. Lucile suffered minimum physical damage ($7,979) and no cargo damage. Ronda was a total loss,
her freight was only $98,500.
'7°Id. at 730.
-Id. at 730. In The Lucile Bloomfield, [1964] 1 Lloyds L. Rep. 324, the English admiralty court
refused to dismiss the arrest of the Lucile in England despite the limitation proceedings in the United
States. The Eastern District of Louisiana held that its limitation injunction had no extraterritorial effect.
In re Bloomfield S.S. Co., 227 F. Supp. 615 (E.D. La. 1964), aff'd, 363 F 2d 872 (5th Cir. 1966).
'When suit by the owners of cargo lost aboard Ronda prompted her owners to petition for limitation,
the Ronda's owners tried to exclude the owners of the Lucile from the effect of the standard restraining
order, in pursuit of a strategy for presenting as controlling the judgment of the English court as to liabil-
ity between the vessels. The owners of cargo lost aboard the Ronda objected to the exclusion, in an unsuc-
cessful effort to thwart limitation. The district court agreed that excluding the owners of the Lucile from
the restraining order was improper, but, instead of dismissing the petition of the owners of the Ronda, sim-
ply extended the order to embrace the Lucile's owners. Petition of A/S J. Ludwig Mowinckels Rederi, 268
F Supp. 682, 1968 AMC 727 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). The author acted of counsel for the owners of the Ronda
in these cases.
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the amount collected from Ronda in settlement ($200,000).'" The owners of
the Ronda were required to pay an equal share of Lucile's collision damage
($3,989), but they were not required to indemnify the owners of the Lucile for
even part of their payments to the owners of the cargo lost aboard Ronda. The
court ruled that Lucile could assert such claim only to the extent that payment
by the non-carrier to cargo exceeded one-half of cargo's total damage claim. 74
One half of Lucile's cargo liability was $831,500 but her limitation fund was
only $680,817.1"
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the
owners of the Lucile asserted a right to $460,000 from Ronda, half of the sum
of Lucile's limitation fund (plus interest) and half of Lucile's own damage.7 6
This claim was clearly rejected by the Second Circuit, which held that a right
of contribution was not an integral part of the vessel's collision damages;
accordingly, the district court had correctly denied the owners of the Lucile
any indemnification recovery from the owners of the Ronda.7'
Dueling limitation petitions were also involved in Allseas Maritime, S.A. v.
M/V Mimosa'78 although the financial consequences were not worked out by
the court in that case, because the shipowners eventually settled with all
claimants except salvors. The collision of the Liberian tankers, Burmah-
Agate and Mimosa in an anchorage area of Galveston Bay led to the deaths
of thirty five members of the crew on Burmah-Agate and of one crew mem-
ber on Mimosa, the loss of Burmah-Agate's crude oil cargo (with consequent
pollution), and the constructive total loss of both vessels. With her rudder
jammed and engines still running, the fiery Mimosa was abandoned by her
crew to run in ever-widening circles, threatening oil drilling rigs and plat-
forms. Eventually, some seven and a half hours after the collision, when her
engines had run dry of fuel and stopped, the drifting wreck was pushed by a
tug out of harm's way.'79 The owners of both vessels petitioned in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Texas to limit their liability,
claims being made by Burmah-Agate's cargo, by surviving crewmen, and on
behalf of the estates of the deceased crewmen from both ships. The tug also
"422 F 2d at 734. Ronda's cargo was subject to the unit limitation ($500) of liability to cargo in the
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 46 U.S.C. § 1304; accordingly, they settled the cargo damage claim for
$200,000. There were no significant personal injuries, but there was an enormous claim against the own-
ers of the Ronda, pursued only in the French courts, for wreck removal at Le Havre.
" Id. at 734-35.
'
5Id. at 734.
1111d. at 734-35.
1id., citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Erie Transp. Co., 204 U.S. 220 (1907), and Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship
Corp., 342 U.S. 282, 1952 AMC 1 (1952), for principles of indemnification.
'574 F Supp. 844 (S.D. Tex 1983), aff'd, 812 F. 2d 243, 1987 AMC 2515.
574 F Supp. at 845-46.
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sought an award for salvage of the Mimosa.'" In this case, application of the
rule of joint and several liability as to the claims by the owner of Burmah-
Agate's cargo was complicated by a clause in the charter party, pertaining to
collisions for which both vessels were to blame, which required the cargo
owner to reimburse the carrier for any indirect liability to cargo as a result of
joint and several liability. 8 ' Once it became apparent that the clause would be
enforced, the parties were able to settle the cargo claims on the basis of the
rule of The North Star."2 The wrongful death and personal injury claims were
likewise settled, and on appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit reduced the salvor's award from $150,000 to $67,500.183
V
CONCLUSION
Despite its derivation from the rule of equal division of damages in colli-
sions where both vessels are to blame, the rule of the North Star still gov-
erns computation today of damages in cases of collision where the Limi-
tation Act is invoked. Results under that rule, however, now vary greatly
depending upon the percentages of fault, rules of joint and several liability
and contribution, Both-to-Blame Collision clauses in charter parties, statu-
tory limits of liability for damage to cargo, indemnification rules and provi-
sions, the "innocence" of claimants, and the priority traditionally assigned
their claims. The situation is even more complicated when one vessel has
settled joint liability claims and the other has not, because indemnification
is not a right of the petitioning party.' " Accordingly, the timing of settle-
'1812 F.2d at 246.
"'Id. at 852-54.
"
2A Both-to-Blame Collision Clause in a bill of lading governed by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act,
46 U.S.C. § 130 let seq., cannot be enforced against cargo owners .United States v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co.,
343 U.S. 236, 1952 AMC 659 (1952). The same clause in a charter party, however, can be. See, e.g.,
Union Transp. Co. v. United States, 1976 AMC 1480 (N.D. Cal. 1976); and this case, 574 F. Supp. at 852-
54.
183812 F.2d at 244-45.
"See Petition of Bloomfield S.S. Co., 422 F.2d 728, 1970 AMC 521 (5th Cir. 1970); Guillot v. Cenac
Towing Co., 366 F. 2d 898, 1966 AMC 2685 (5th Cir. 1966). See generally Staring, Contribution and
Division of Damages in Admiralty and Maritime Cases, 45 Cal. L. Rev. 304. 337 (1957).
In The Voco, 93 F. Supp. 718, 1950 AMC 1552 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), an innocent vessel claimed in the
limitation proceedings of two guilty vessels but was allowed to recover only two thirds of her damages;
it is possible that the court so ruled in order to minimize the effect of this innocent claim on other
claimants because this claimant could recover outside this limitation action-from the other guilty ves-
sel. See also The Doris Eckoff, 41 F. 156 (SDNY 1890), which involved a collision of two vessels, both
then being controlled by tugs. The court found the four vessels at fault and assessed the percentage allo-
cations, referring to the possibility of non-collection and noting that, "Whatever portion of the one-fourth
payable by each is not available by reason of inability to collect it, or by reason of limitation of liability,
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ments of cargo or personal injury claims will be most important. The expec-
tation, hopefully justified, is that the limitation courts will attempt to act in
an equitable manner toward both innocent claimants and the shipowner ben-
eficiaries of the 1851 Congress. While the dismal science of economics may
have provided the justification for the original enactment of the Limitation
of Liability Act, at a time when insurances were primitive and vessel own-
ers knew nothing about their investments for months at a time, protections
available to the shipping industry are far greater today, so natural law and
justice cry out against preserving investors at the expense of innocent vic-
tims.
must be borne pro rata by the remaining vessels or their owners, and so on." 41 F at 157. Cf. In re Eastern
Dredging Co., 182 F. 179 (D. Mass. 1909).
The case of The George W. Roby, Ill F. 601 (6th Cir. 1901), arose after a both-to-blame collision on
Lake Huron. The steamship Florida sank but the steamer George W Roby survived, and the latter vessel's
owners petitioned for limitation. The Roby's limitation fund was $59,300, and the claims against it were
$118,377. The court gave priority to the claims of those owning cargo aboard the Florida over the claims
of those owning the lost vessel. Because the fund was insufficient to pay in full the Florida cargo claims,
the Florida's owners got nothing. Florida owners claimed the right to a set-off, whereby they would
recover $11,398 by setting one half of the decree against the Roby against one half of the value of the
Florida. The court negotiated the set-off on the authority of The North Star, 106 U.S. 17 (1882), and The
Chattahoochee, 173 U.S. 540 (1899).
Illustrative examples of adjustments to final judgments under The North Star rule can be found in N.
Healy & J. Sweeney, The Law of Marine Collision 591-94 (1998).
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